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Abstract
This study explores the relationship between several personal religion-related variables and social behaviour, using three
paradigmatic economic games: the dictator (DG), ultimatum (UG), and trust (TG) games. A large carefully designed sample
of the urban adult population in Granada (Spain) is employed (N= 766). From participants’ decisions in these games we
obtain measures of altruism, bargaining behaviour and sense of fairness/equality, trust, and positive reciprocity. Three
dimensions of religiosity are examined: (i) religious denomination; (ii) intensity of religiosity, measured by active
participation at church services; and (iii) conversion out into a different denomination than the one raised in. The major
results are: (i) individuals with ‘‘no religion’’ made decisions closer to rational selfish behaviour in the DG and the UG
compared to those who affiliate with a ‘‘standard’’ religious denomination; (ii) among Catholics, intensity of religiosity is the
key variable that affects social behaviour insofar as religiously-active individuals are generally more pro-social than non-
active ones; and (iii) the religion raised in seems to have no effect on pro-sociality, beyond the effect of the current
measures of religiosity. Importantly, behaviour in the TG is not predicted by any of the religion-related variables we analyse.
While the results partially support the notion of religious pro-sociality, on the other hand, they also highlight the
importance of closely examining the multidimensional nature of both religiosity and pro-social behaviour.
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Introduction
Rules and norms of behaviour are fundamental elements of
religions. Religions usually contain systems of ideas and rules
about how life should be lived. The rules are not restricted to the
family (or the individual) but cover also the social dimension, that
is, how to behave in the community. These social norms prevent
individuals from misconduct within the society (‘‘Thou shalt not
kill, not commit adultery, not steal, not bear false witness against thy
neighbour, …’’, Ten Commandments) and therefore restrain anti-
social behaviour. Moreover, most religions promote generosity
towards members of the society and also towards foreigners (in
Islam the concept of i’thar, that is ‘‘preferring others to oneself’’,
especially towards those who need support; in Judaism, one is
requested to give one tenth of his earnings to the needy; or ‘‘One
who does not give to the poor has no luck’’, Proverbs 28:27).
Religions also promote egalitarian distribution of resources. As
noted in [1] and [2], egalitarianism is behind the idea of religious
charity: sharing with those who have less.
One of the basic principles of religions is that God observes
what humans do. It follows that individuals believe that they are
constantly monitored by Him, who has the power to punish those
who deviate from the norm, and reward those who follow the rules
(e.g., [3], [4]). Punishment and reward are expected in both the
current life and the afterlife. [5] provides empirical evidence (based
on a large dataset, estimating equations of attendance of church
services) that both the fear of divine punishment (Hell) and the
expectation of divine reward (Heaven) significantly affect church
attendance. Interestingly, belief in Heaven (reward) has a stronger
incentive for church attendance than belief in Hell (punishment).
Accordingly, religiosity has proved to exert some effect on
individual decision-making and behaviour. An extensive literature
shows that religion and religiosity (as well as other cultural traits)
matter to important economic phenomena, such as: educational
attainments ([6], [7]); labour force participation ([8]); income and
financial assets ([9]); marriage and inter-faith marriage ([10]);
fertility ([8], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17]).
It was also demonstrated that religion and intensity of religiosity
affect social interactions and attitudes: several studies relate to
donations (e.g., [18], [19], [20]) and show that intensity of religious
participation is positively associated with amounts donated in
charity giving. In a similar vein, [21] finds a positive relationship
between religiosity and trust in others and in institutions. [22] uses
a sample of Latin American Catholics and show that religiously-
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active Catholics trust peers and institutions more, compared to
non-active Catholics and individuals who belong to other
denominations.
An accelerating phenomenon (in Europe and elsewhere) is the
growing number of individuals who claim to have ‘‘no religion’’.
Data from the 2002–2010 waves of the European Social Survey
(ESS) include 39.1% of respondents who identify their religion as
‘‘no religion’’ ([23]). A recent report published by the Pew
Research Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life ([24]) claims
that the third largest ‘‘religion’’ is the ‘‘no religion’’ – it is estimated
that there are 1.1 billion individuals who claim to have ‘‘no
religion’’ (16% of the world population; the majority lives in
communist countries, 700 million in China). Christianity is the
largest religion (2.2 billion individuals, comprising 32% of the
world population) and Islam comes second (1.6 billion individuals,
comprising 23% of world population). After the third ‘‘no religion’’
denomination, the fourth is Hindu (1 billion individuals) and the
fifth is Buddhism (0.5 billion). Only 14 million individuals belong
to the faith of Judaism (0.02 percent of world population). Given
the pronounced share of the ‘‘no-religion’’ group it is essential to
study their social behaviour as it will have significant effects on
society.
Another significant phenomenon is the increasing influx of
immigrants (into Europe and other regions), who compose a
considerable share of the populations in many countries (see [23],
Table 1). The intensified religiosity of immigrants (compared to
natives) became a fundamental issue that could affect all spheres of
life, including the economic and social domains. If religiosity is
related to social behaviour as our study tries to explore (and the
causal relation goes from religiosity to social behaviour), we can
speculate that the outcome could be major changes in social
behaviour and social institutions in Europe, which could as well
affect other domains of the society and economy.
It should be noted that all the studies cited above on the
relationship between religiosity and pro-social behaviour are based
on self-reported survey data, rather than the direct observation of
the individual’s attitude and behaviour. Nonetheless, there are
several experimental studies that investigate the role of religious
denomination and intensity of religiosity on social behaviour, using
economic games. Yet the results vary and are not conclusive. For
instance, [25] – using a sample of 64 subjects, at the age of 50 and
over – investigates whether religious denomination and intensity of
attendance of church services are correlated with cooperation.
They are using a repeated public good experiment, and find that
neither denomination nor church-attendance significantly affect
contributions to the public good. The experiment was replicated
by [26] using a sample of 144 students, yielding similar
insignificant effects, although contributions appear to increase
with frequency of church attendance among subjects attending
religious services. Moreover, [26] also find that church attendance
does not have a significant effect on the outcomes of a trust game.
Similarly, [27] does not find clear effects of individual-level
religious variables on cooperation and trusting behaviour, in
public good and trust game experiments, with 255 and 181
subjects, respectively. Using a large sample from three European
countries, [28] does however find a weak positive effect of
religiosity, measured by time devoted to religious associations, on
the amounts passed by the ‘‘trustors’’ to the ‘‘trustees’’ in a trust
game. In a similar vein, [29] reports a positive correlation between
attendance at religious services and donations to charities, in an
experiment with 168 subjects. [30], using a sample of 102 men,
finds that religious students (preparing to enter the clergy in India)
are more cooperative in a public good game and give more in a
dictator game than non-religious ones.
In order to avoid the causality problems associated with studies
that look at correlations, recent research has made use of religious
priming in economic experiments. Using two samples, of 50 and
78 subjects, [31] finds that individuals who were assigned to a
treatment with a scramble-sentence task aimed at priming
religious concepts, were more generous in a dictator game
(although, importantly, a similar effect was found when priming
subjects with words related to secular moral institutions). However,
in a similar experimental setup, using a larger sample of 304
subjects and a modified ultimatum game, [32] did not find a
significant effect of religious priming on subjects’ ‘‘altruistic
punishment’’ of unfair behaviour, although a significant positive
effect was found for those subjects who had previously donated to
a religious organisation.
In a large experimental study (N.800), [33] explores the
impact of religious identity – which was made salient by using a
sentence-unscrambling task – on: contributions in a public good
game; giving in a dictator game; risk aversion, time discounting
and behaviour in a labour market task. Results are unclear: after
religious priming, Protestants contribute more to the public good,
Catholics contribute less and become less risk averse, while Jews
reciprocate more in the labour market game. Also, they find no
evidence that ‘‘religious identity salience’’ affects discount rates or
purely altruistic generosity in the dictator game. Based on two
experiments with 69 and 547 subjects, [34] analyses the effect of
explicit religious primes on subjects’ behaviour in a prisoner’s
dilemma game. It suggests a positive effect of religious primes on
cooperation, at least among Christians. See [4], for a review of
previous research on religious priming and a discussion on the
origins and the evolutionary roots of religious pro-sociality, and
[35], for a critical examination.
Thus, the results regarding how religion affects social behaviour
in economic experiments have been far less conclusive than what
one would expect according to the notion of religious pro-sociality.
In this paper, we aim to add to this literature of Experimental
Economics of Religion (see [36]). Using a large heterogeneous
sample of 766 subjects, sampled from the urban adult population
in Granada (Spain), we explore how individual religious variables
correlate with social behaviour in three canonical economic
games. Specifically, from participants’ decisions in these games we
obtained measures of altruism (giving in a dictator game, DG),
bargaining behaviour and sense of fairness/equality (offer and
minimum acceptable offer – MAO – in an ultimatum game, UG),
trust (passing the money in a binary trust game, TG) and positive
reciprocity (returning part of the trusted amount in the TG). See
Methods. Note that the causality of the relationships we study can
also run from pro-sociality to religiosity: e.g., it might be that
people who share some social preferences are more likely to
affiliate with a particular religious denomination. However, the
very low share of respondents who declared having changed their
religious denomination (for instance, not even one individual in
our sample declared having been raised in a ‘‘non-religious
denomination’’ and, later on, converted into a religious one; see
below) suggests that causality runs mainly from religiosity to social
behaviour, and not the other way around. Yet, although we
include a large set of statistical controls in the analyses, there might
exist unobserved third variables that could confound the
relationships under investigation, so that causality problems
cannot be fully ruled out and concerns regarding this issue may
thus be valid.
Three dimensions of religiosity are considered and examined:
the subjects’ religion/denomination (61.6% are Catholics; 2%
Muslims; 0.8% Evangelicals; 4.3% have other religions; and
31.3% are claiming to have ‘‘no-religion’’, hereafter NR; we find a
Religious Pro-Sociality? Experimental Evidence
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Table 1. Catholics versus non-Catholics.
DG offer UG offer UG MAO Trustor Trustee
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Catholic 0.625 0.318 0.573** 0.026 20.158
(0.479) (0.238) (0.271) (0.116) (0.129)
age 0.024 20.011 0.110** 0.007 20.000
(0.082) (0.053) (0.043) (0.021) (0.021)
age sq. 20.000 0.000 20.001** 20.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
male 20.392 20.055 20.083 20.082 0.043
(0.392) (0.214) (0.242) (0.103) (0.111)
house income 20.139 0.008 0.083 20.002 20.015
(0.104) (0.058) (0.064) (0.024) (0.026)
education 0.008 0.049 20.096 20.015 20.004
(0.110) (0.073) (0.065) (0.026) (0.026)
unemployed 20.467 20.030 0.412 0.165 20.100
(0.417) (0.240) (0.290) (0.103) (0.128)
married 0.697 0.023 21.239*** 0.238 0.084
(0.701) (0.405) (0.472) (0.172) (0.196)
divorced 2.030** 0.074 21.043 0.058 0.231
(0.800) (0.699) (0.734) (0.275) (0.294)
widowed 20.398 0.061 20.146 0.332 0.243
(1.007) (0.580) (0.768) (0.281) (0.386)
cohabiting 20.163 20.849* 20.308 0.450* 20.301
(1.216) (0.463) (0.721) (0.259) (0.310)
impatience 20.096 20.084** 0.093** 0.007 0.011
(0.081) (0.040) (0.046) (0.018) (0.021)
risk 1 20.238 0.011 1.174*** 20.134 20.414***
(0.562) (0.309) (0.371) (0.133) (0.150)
risk 2 0.653 20.130 20.169 0.183* 20.099
(0.403) (0.269) (0.316) (0.104) (0.104)
risk 3 1.695*** 0.816** 21.002* 0.920*** 0.569***
(0.598) (0.371) (0.596) (0.219) (0.185)
cogn skills 20.148 20.023 0.245** 0.001 0.096**
(0.179) (0.094) (0.106) (0.044) (0.042)
many immigr 20.302*** 20.104 0.027 20.094*** 20.080***
(0.098) (0.065) (0.060) (0.027) (0.025)
big public sector 0.421 0.027 0.298 20.017 0.118
(0.389) (0.259) (0.265) (0.114) (0.125)
Constant 9.834*** 10.179*** 3.351*** 0.360 0.569
(2.235) (1.148) (1.102) (0.480) (0.564)
LR 3.171*** 1.520** 2.829*** 95.259*** 131.556***
ll 22047.190 21907.167 22030.929 2436.102 2414.165
N 766 766 766 766 766
Notes: Dependent variables are displayed on top of the columns. Tobit estimates for models (1) and (2), OLS for model (3) and Probit for models (4) and (5). Robust SEs
clustered by interviewer are presented (in parentheses). All regressions control for order effects.
* p,0.1,
** p,0.05,
*** p,0.01.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0104685.t001
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similar figure in Europe (39.1% NR, using ESS); frequency of
church-attendance; and if the respondent changed her/his religion
at some point in her/his life (from any denomination to another,
including NR; for instance, 12.3% of respondents in the sample
changed from Catholic to NR). The terms ‘‘no religion’’ and
‘‘non-believer’’ will be used interchangeably. See Methods.
Using the above information, this paper aims at answering the
following questions: do Catholics (compared to the rest of the
sample) exhibit a different social behaviour? Are those who claim
to have no-religion (with respect to the rest of the sample, i.e.,
believers in any denomination) less or more pro-social? Is it just
denomination that matters, or is religious intensity (measured by
attendance to religious services) the key variable explaining social
behaviour? And, finally, are religion-specific social values trans-
mitted from parents to children? Data on religious conversion can
help in answering the last question. It could be indicated by an
examination of a group of individuals who currently share the
same religion and comparing two within sub-groups: those who
always had that religion, versus the sub-group that changed
denomination (i.e., was raised within a different religion).
While these are interesting general questions, given the
multidimensional nature of both social behaviour and religiosity,
it is also essential to unravel in which specific dimensions are
religiosity and social behaviour interconnected. Our set of
experimental variables will facilitate such an examination.
We believe that our results provide a true reflection of the
relationship between religiosity and social behaviour, and thus
contribute significantly to the relatively scarce existing experimen-
tal literature. Our findings are trusted to be highly reliable due to
(i) the use of several types of games: DG, UG, and TG; (ii) the
length of the questionnaire (more than 100 items on a large variety
of issues), which makes it unlikely that religious priming – related
to having answered a few questions regarding religiosity – affects
subjects’ subsequent behaviour in the games; (iii) the large sample;
(iv) the composition of the sample, that includes representative
ordinary people, with varied socio-demographic characteristics,
rather than only University students who compose the majority of
samples in experimental economics studies; and (v) the unique
sample that does not consist of only self-selected volunteers who
come to the lab (which is common in most studies). Instead,
interviewers went to the respondents’ places. The last two features
are exclusive and innovative and distinguish our experiments from
the standard experiments presented in the literature. Although
self-selected students (i.e. the typical subject pool of economic
experiments) seem to have social preferences similar on average to
those found in the general population ([37]), still more behavioural
heterogeneity is expected in more representative samples (e.g.,
[38]). Heterogeneity in both religion-related variables and social
behaviour are fundamental for our analyses.
The following section presents the findings, and the last section
offers concluding remarks and implications. A detailed description
of the variables and the procedures used can be found in Methods.
Results
We will first explore if the religion/denomination per se displays a
significant relationship with social behaviour. Two sub-populations
are compared:
Catholics with the rest of the sample (regressions presented in
Table 1), that is, the majority denomination vs. the rest;
NR with all others (including Catholics, Table 2), i.e., non-
believers vs. believers.
As in many other studies within the field of the Economics of
Religion, ‘‘no-religion/not-believing’’ is also considered a religious
denomination (see for instance, [39]). We do not relate specifically
to social attributes of other religions (e.g., Evangelical, Muslim),
due to their small sample sizes.
Five models are presented in each Table (columns (1)–(5)): DG
and UG offers (in J, from 0 to 20) are the dependent variables in
models (1) and (2), using Tobit regressions; column (3) explores
UG MAO (in J, from 0 to 10), using an OLS regression model;
finally, (4) and (5) are Probit models analysing behaviour in the
roles of TG trustor and trustee, respectively. These same
specifications were used in [37]. Alternative specifications yield
qualitatively similar results. As in [37] robust standard errors are
clustered on interviewers.
Socio-economic variables are included in order to arrive at net
effects of our core variables, controlling for socio-economic
differences between respondents. The same control variables are
used in the two regression sets presented in Tables 1 and 2. Their
effects are not much different in the two tables:
Age has an inverse U-shaped parabolic effect on the individuals’
sense of fairness (UG MAO). Both age and age-squared are
significant, indicating that MAO increases with age, reaches a
maximum at about 55 and then decreases. No any other relevant
effect is found to be related to age.
Married people are less prone to ask for equal shares (MAO) in
the UG, indicating that they behave closer to the Nash equilibrium
compared to singles. Divorced are more generous (DG). Cohab-
iting individuals offer less in the UG but trust more (pass the
money as trustors) in the TG. However, both estimates are only
marginally significant.
Impatient subjects offer less as proposers in the UG – they seem
to be less strategically generous – but they ask for a larger share of
the pie as responders. Obviously, impatient individuals are not
easy to manage in bargaining and agreement processes. A deeper
analysis of this result is reported in [40] where it is argued that
impatience may be associated with a preference for spiteful
competition in bargaining.
Turning to the effect of risk attitudes: risk-lovers in the gains’
domain (risk 1) ask for more money in the UG (which is somehow
a risky strategy) but they don’t reciprocate in the TG (indicating
that they are not very pro-social). Quite consistently, those who are
ready to lose money (risk 3) risk their own money as trustors in the
TG. Contrary to Risk 1 these subjects seem pro-social: they share
more in the DG and UG, ask less in the UG, and trust and
reciprocate more in the TG. In any case, these results should be
treated with caution, due to the use of hypothetical incentives for
the elicitation of risk attitudes and given that the three risk
variables are correlated (multicollinearity).
Individuals with better cognitive skills demand more money as
responders in the UG, but they are also more prone to return (to
reciprocate as trustees) in the TG, indicating that they may have a
larger sense of reciprocity or, perhaps, of social responsibility.
Finally, those who claim that there are too many immigrants
share less in the DG, which suggest that people who have little
empathy for foreigners are also not so nice with locals – although it
could be argued that they overestimate the likelihood that an
immigrant will be the recipient of their offer. In addition, they
offer less in the UG, they don’t pass money in the TG, and also
don’t give the money back in the TG. Clearly, those who do not
like immigrants are not very pro-social.
No significant effects of education, income or gender are found.
We can therefore conclude that socio-demographics are not very
relevant, but some specific personal characteristics related to
preferences (risk attitudes, impatience) or cognitive skills are
affecting decisions in several games.
Religious Pro-Sociality? Experimental Evidence
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Table 2. Non-believers/No religion versus believers.
DG offer UG offer UG MAO Trustor Trustee
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
no-religion 20.939* 20.547** 20.645** 0.039 0.181
(0.506) (0.251) (0.318) (0.126) (0.123)
age 0.024 20.011 0.109** 0.006 0.000
(0.083) (0.053) (0.043) (0.021) (0.021)
age sq. 20.000 0.000 20.001** 20.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
male 20.401 20.055 20.110 20.090 0.050
(0.397) (0.218) (0.240) (0.101) (0.112)
house income 20.139 0.007 0.086 20.001 20.016
(0.104) (0.058) (0.064) (0.024) (0.026)
education 0.019 0.056 20.090 20.016 20.005
(0.110) (0.073) (0.064) (0.027) (0.026)
unemployed 20.441 20.015 0.428 0.164 20.107
(0.412) (0.239) (0.292) (0.103) (0.128)
married 0.638 20.017 21.265*** 0.246 0.091
(0.709) (0.415) (0.468) (0.173) (0.196)
divorced 1.974** 0.041 21.061 0.068 0.241
(0.800) (0.701) (0.739) (0.274) (0.293)
widowed 20.434 0.038 20.172 0.332 0.249
(1.015) (0.588) (0.761) (0.282) (0.385)
cohabiting 20.076 20.786* 20.285 0.434* 20.312
(1.210) (0.472) (0.734) (0.261) (0.307)
impatience 20.097 20.085** 0.094** 0.008 0.010
(0.081) (0.040) (0.046) (0.018) (0.021)
risk 1 20.200 0.036 1.201*** 20.137 20.422***
(0.555) (0.304) (0.376) (0.134) (0.150)
risk 2 0.673* 20.120 20.162 0.181* 20.101
(0.404) (0.268) (0.320) (0.104) (0.104)
risk 3 1.647*** 0.780** 21.008* 0.934*** 0.572***
(0.593) (0.371) (0.604) (0.216) (0.186)
cogn skills 20.145 20.022 0.249** 0.002 0.095**
(0.179) (0.095) (0.106) (0.044) (0.042)
many immigr 20.313*** 20.112* 0.027 20.091*** 20.079***
(0.098) (0.068) (0.059) (0.027) (0.026)
big public sector 0.415 0.021 0.298 20.016 0.117
(0.385) (0.257) (0.267) (0.114) (0.125)
Constant 10.481*** 10.611*** 3.847*** 0.346 0.419
(2.282) (1.172) (1.134) (0.478) (0.548)
LR 3.214*** 1.612** 2.879*** 93.804*** 136.593***
ll 22045.933 21905.847 22030.549 2436.072 2413.943
N 766 766 766 766 766
Notes: Dependent variables are displayed on top of the columns. Tobit estimates for models (1) and (2), OLS for model (3) and Probit for models (4) and (5). Robust SEs
clustered by interviewer are presented (in parentheses). All regressions control for order effects.
* p,0.1,
** p,0.05,
*** p,0.01.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0104685.t002
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Turning now to our core variable of religious denomination,
Table 1 focuses on Catholics versus the rest of the sample,
including NRs. We do not find any sound result rather than the
positive relationship of Catholic with UG MAO. That is, Catholics
tend to ask for more money as responders in the UG. Since we do
not find any effect related to generosity (either pure (DG) or
strategic (UG proposer)), trust (TG trustor), or reciprocation (TG
trustee) we may say that there is a positive relationship between
being Catholic and the aversion to disadvantageous, but not
advantageous, inequality.
Interestingly, when the sample is restricted to ‘‘standard’’
religions only, excluding NRs, the effect of UG MAO becomes
insignificant too (regression results not presented, can be provided
upon request). We can therefore conclude that Catholics do not
exhibit a different pro-social behaviour compared to members of
other faiths.
In Table 2 the sub-sample of NRs is contrasted with the rest of
participants (i.e., individuals who belong to the ‘‘standard’’
religions, including Catholics). Results are sharper now: those
who classify themselves as NRs are less generous in the DG
(although marginally), offer less as proposers in the UG and claim
less money as responders (that might be indicative of a less strict
sense of fairness). Hence we may conclude that NRs are less
generous and not strongly driven by fairness/equality.
Interestingly, NRs are not different from ‘‘believers/individuals
with a religion’’ in terms of trust: neither in terms of passing the pie
to the second mover (trustor) nor in terms of returning the money
(trustee). Given that previous results have been inconsistent (e.g.,
[26], [27], [28], [33]), and based on our carefully-designed large
sample, we may conclude that the effects of believing in a religion
on trust and trustworthiness, if any, are not clear and may be
influenced by other factors, such as the country of residence, the
specific religion or other institutional/contextual variables.
We will now relate to the relationship between intensity of
religiosity (measured by frequent attendance of church services)
and social behaviour, by distinguishing between active worshipers
who go to church (place of worship) at least once a month and
non-active ones who do not go to church on a regular basis (less
than once a month). Table S1 in File S1 reports these regressions.
In order to hold constant the effect of denomination and focus
on intensity of religious performance, we will relate to the sub-
sample of Catholics, who constitute over 60% of the sample. All
other religions have a very low representation that does not allow
for a meaningful distinction between active and non-active
worshipers (Muslims 22%, Evangelicals 20.8%, and all other
religions combined 24.3%). NRs compose more than 30% of the
sample, however a distinction between active- and non-active
attenders of church services is obviously meaningless.
An examination of the effects of the control variables shows
some differences between the whole sample and the subsample of
Catholics. Nor age, neither the marital status of married are
significant predictors of UG MAO, and cohabiting is no longer
affecting TG behaviour. The effect of impatience disappears for
Catholic respondents while the connection between risk attitudes
and behaviour along the reported games remains basically
unaltered. The effect of cognitive skills is also similar in the UG
but its relationship with TG behaviour now relates to the role of
the trustor and becomes negative. The negative view about
immigrants seems to be less important for the subsample of
Catholics, since its negative effect on pro-social behaviour is now
restricted to the TG.
While we acknowledge that establishing causality may be even
more problematic when studying religious participation, our
conjecture is that frequent participation in church services will
affect social/moral behaviour: the frequent attenders are more
knowledgeable about religious texts and doctrines and in closer
contact with the priest, inducing them to follow these moral rules
and doctrines.
The performance of our core variable ‘‘being an active
Catholic’’ is interesting: members of this sub-sample do give
(marginally) more in the DG, which is reflecting a clearer sense of
altruism and is quite consistent with what we saw in Table 1. In
line with the results of [41] suggesting a negative relationship
between ritual activity and MAO, we also find that active
Catholics demand less money (than non-active Catholics) as
responders in the UG.
To further explore these results, we performed regressions
comparing active and non-active Catholics with NRs – i.e.,
excluding believers of other religions from the analyses – in terms
of DG offers and UG MAOs (not reported; available upon
request). We find that non-active Catholics do not offer
significantly more than NRs in the DG (b=0.478, n.s.) but active
Catholics do (b=1.543, p,0.05). With regards to MAO, non-
active Catholics demand significantly more than NRs (b=0.992,
p,0.01) while active Catholics do not (b=0.167, n.s.).
The difference between those with high and low attendance
levels could reflect the effect of religious social interaction on social
preferences (see [41]). While non-active Catholics have a more
strict sense of self-centred fairness (i.e., they ask for a more
egalitarian distribution as responders), active Catholics are playing
closer to the Nash equilibrium (NE), accepting lower offers than
non-active ones. Remember that the larger group of all Catholics
(Table 1) exhibited a tendency of demanding more money.
Combining the two seemingly contradictory findings leads to the
conclusion that within the group of Catholics, there are major
differences between active and non-active individuals. The larger
sub-group of non-actives (67.8% of Catholics) dominates and leads
to a larger MAO when no distinction (related to religious activity)
is made.
Note therefore that while intensity of religious participation
apparently strengthens the effect of being affiliated with a religion
(versus a ‘‘no-religion’’) on DG generosity, the former effect
partially counteracts the latter when it comes to the rejection of
unfair offers in the UG. It should be emphasised that behaving as
if playing closer to the NE (in the case of active, compared to non-
active, Catholics) as UG responder, is not necessarily an indication
of more selfish behaviour. It is true that purely money-maximising
subjects would accept any positive offer, setting MAO to its
minimum value. However, it is also true that extremely pro-social
subjects – very concerned with other players’ payoffs – would
accept any offer just to maximise the counterpart’s profits (and
social welfare). [42] presents support for this idea, using
information from post-experimental interviews that shows that a
large share of those who played the NE argued that ‘‘maybe the
other player needs the money’’ as the principal reason to accept any
offer, even zero. In the same vein, the results of [43] provide strong
evidence that setting MAO to the minimum amount (i.e., zero) is a
symptom of pro-social behaviour. In our case, the most obvious
suggestion that playing the NE as responder does not indicate
selfish behaviour is drawn from subjects’ behaviour in the DG,
which can be used to disentangle selfishness from pro-social
preferences: the positive coefficient of active Catholics demon-
strates that active Catholics give more money as dictators (column
(1), Table S1 in file S1). This is clearly indicating that this sub-
sample of active Catholics is less selfish. We may therefore
conclude that active Catholics ask for less money in the UG
(MAO) because they have a higher sense of generosity.
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A different explanation of the MAO results might relate to the
use of rejections as a form of ‘‘altruistic punishment’’ of norm
violations. [44] shows that while religiosity generally increases the
use of punishment of wrongdoing in a third-party setting, the
specific belief in powerful, intervening Gods reduces it. It could be
argued that church-attendance might be positively related with
such belief in a ‘‘supernatural punisher’’. Therefore, the lower
MAOs shown by active, in comparison to non-active, Catholics
could reflect a higher propensity to believe that it is not humans
but God who should punish wrongdoers. However, the view of
rejections in the UG as ‘‘altruistic punishment’’ of norm violations
is being challenged on the basis that a large number of rejections
seem to be triggered by pro-self, competitive motives (see [40], and
the references quoted there).
Utilising the information on the third dimension of religiosity,
namely the experience of conversion into a religion that is different
from the one educated/raised in (see also [45] on converting-out),
can shed light on the effects of childhood experience and cultural
transmission from parents to their offspring. An extensive
literature claims that values and norms (including religious norms)
are transmitted across generations (e.g., [46], [47], [17]). The
relatively large sample of NRs who were previously Catholic (94
out of 240 who are currently NRs were raised as Catholics and at
some stage in life converted to NR), can be used to answer this
interesting question.
Table S2 in File S1 presents the repeated regressions of DG
offer, UG offer, UG MAO, trustor and trustee for the sub-sample
of individuals who are currently NRs, including a dummy variable
for the sub-group of subjects who were raised as Catholics before
converting to NR.
The conclusion is quite straightforward. The two sub-groups of
NRs are not different in terms of social preferences (insignificant
coefficients in all five models). This result contrasts the theory that
claims that values are transferred from parents to children. Our
data does not lend support to this wide-spread theory. Therefore,
perhaps the observed effects of religiosity on social behaviour have
to do more with recently occurring life events than with early
education. However, we should keep in mind that we relate to a
distinct and very special (although growing) group that consists of
NR individuals. Further research on this issue is warranted.
Discussion
A large well-designed sample of Spanish individuals is used to
explore the relationship between (i) religious denomination; (ii)
religious intensity; and (iii) religious conversion and social
behaviour, using the dictator, ultimatum and trust games.
The main results and implications of the paper are the
following:
i) The sub-sample of ‘‘no religion’’ individuals (30% of the
sample) is less generous compared to members of any ‘‘standard’’
religion, indicated by passing less money in both the dictator and
the ultimatum games. In other words, those who classify
themselves as NRs are more selfish. In addition, their MAO is
lower, that is, they are more likely to accept unfair offers in the
UG. Behaving as if playing the NE combined with selfishness in
the DG is indicative of a perfect rational self-interested behaviour.
Given the accelerating shares of ‘‘no religion’’ individuals in
Europe (and elsewhere), and assuming that this result can be
generalised for other places as well, we can project that the society
could become more self-interested as a result of the dominant role of
non-believers.
ii) Catholics are willing to reject unfair offers in the UG (higher
MAO) more than the rest of the sample. They are not significantly
different in terms of other social behaviours. In our Spanish
sample the shares of ‘‘other religious denominations’’ is very low.
More than 90% of the sample is composed of Catholics and ‘‘no
religion’’ respondents. It follows that little can be proposed about
the pro-sociality of other religions, and as a result this finding
could not be generalised and applied to other (more religiously
diverse) countries.
iii) Religious intensity (measured by active attendance of church
services) matters above and beyond denomination: comparing
religiously-active Catholics with non-active Catholics, we find that
the former are more generous in the DG (while Catholics as a
whole do not exhibit a differential behaviour in the DG) and claim
less in the UG, that is, like in [41] MAO decreases with
attendance. We can therefore conclude that there are differences
in social behaviour within the group of Catholics, and active
Catholics exhibit a more pro-social behaviour than non-active
Catholics (similar results are shown in [29], and [30]). Due to the
small shares of other denominations, it was not possible to
distinguish between active- and non-active worshipers of other
religions, other than Catholicism.
The two demographic phenomena described above: increasing
numbers of ‘‘no religion’’ individuals on the one hand, and of
actively-religious immigrants on the other hand, may have
opposing effects on society. Given the much more pronounced
growth rates of NRs, we arrive at quite pessimistic projections of a
society that could become less generous and less pro-social.
Unravelling the dynamic effects these two phenomena may have
on societies’ average social behaviour is an interesting issue for
future research.
iv) It appears that only the current denomination (or ‘‘no
denomination’’) affects social behaviour. Respondents who were
raised as Catholics and then converted to ‘‘no religion’’ do not
exhibit different social preferences compared to ‘‘all life’’ NRs.
While the ‘‘cultural transmission’’ literature ([47]) emphasizes
childhood experiences and proposes that transmission of values/
beliefs from parents to their offspring during childhood is affecting
behaviour later in life, our results suggest that social behaviour is
associated mainly with more recent, adulthood religious practice.
v) Like [26] and [27], we fail to find any significant relationship
between religious denomination or religious activity and subjects’
behaviour in either role of the TG. Given the large number of
observations we analyse, such a systematic result is noteworthy and
should be further examined. A potential explanation could be that
trust games are not the proper device for the measurement of
trust-related behaviour. Indeed, there is much debate on whether
this type of problem should be interpreted in terms of trust and
trustworthiness or instead in terms of an investment problem ([48],
[49]).
Methods
This section contains extensive information about the proce-
dures and methods, divided in three parts. First, we describe the
sample obtained through a stratified random method. Second, we
focus on the protocol and the experimental games. The last section
is devoted to the dataset and the large battery of controls it allows
to employ (e.g., gender, income, education, age, political views,
cognitive skills…).
Sampling
The survey-experiment was conducted in Granada (Spain) in
2010. Detailed information of the protocol, including survey and
experimental instructions, can be found in [37]. A stratified
random method was used to obtain the sample. In particular, the
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city was divided into nine geographical districts, which served as
sampling strata. Within each stratum, a proportional random
method was applied to minimise sampling errors. This method
ensures a geographically representative sample of the adult
population of Granada.
The sample consists of individuals who agreed to complete the
survey when the interviewers (who worked in pairs for security and
logistic reasons) invited them to participate. Being interviewed in
the own apartments decreases opportunity costs (thus increasing
the participation rate) and to some extent prevents selection-bias
(that could exist when volunteers are coming to the lab). Although
this procedure does not completely eliminate self-selection, it
seems rather clear that the reduction in opportunity costs related
to being interviewed at home reduces possible selection-biases as
well (see [37] for further arguments and analyses on this issue).
Moreover, participants did not self-select into a monetarily-
incentivised experiment but into a ‘‘study’’ (see below). In order to
control for selection-bias within households, only the individual
who opened the door was allowed to participate. Lastly, the data
collection process was well distributed across both daytime and
weekday. This sampling procedure resulted in a representative
sample of the city’s adult population in terms of age and gender
([37]).
Protocol and the experimental games
The interviewers were senior University students enrolled in a
course on ‘‘Field Experiments’’. Their performance was linked to
their final grade in the course and carefully monitored by the main
researchers in real time by means of a web-based system and
follow-up calls to randomly selected participants in order to ensure
the reliability of the data collected. The interviewers introduced
themselves to the potential participants and explained that they
were carrying out a study for the University of Granada. Upon
explicit oral agreement to participate, the participants were
informed that the data would be used for scientific purposes only
and under conditions of anonymity, according to the Spanish Law
on Data Protection. One interviewer read the questions clearly,
while the other noted down the answers (to the socio-economic
questions). The duration of the survey-experiment averaged 40
minutes and 835 observations were finally obtained.
In the first part, extensive socio-economic information of the
participants was collected. In the second part, participants played
both roles of three paradigmatic games of research on social
preferences, namely the dictator game (DG), the ultimatum game
(UG) and the trust game (TG). Thus, each participant made five
decisions, since the second player in the DG is totally passive. At
the beginning of the second part, the participants received some
general information about the nature of experimental economic
games according to standard procedures. In particular, partici-
pants were informed that:
i) The five decisions involved real monetary payoffs, coming
from a national research project endowed with a specific budget
for this purpose;
ii) The monetary outcome would depend on the participant’s
decision, or on both her/his own and another randomly matched
participant’s decision, whose identity would forever remain
anonymous;
iii) One of every ten participants would be randomly selected to
be paid, and the exact payoff would be determined by a randomly
selected decision (role/game);
iv) Matching and payment would be implemented within the
next few days;
iv) The procedures ensure absolute double-blinded anonymity
by using a decision sheet, which participants would place in the
provided envelope and then seal. Thus, their decisions would
remain forever unknown to: the interviewers, the researchers, and
the randomly matched participant.
Once the general instructions had been explained, the
interviewer read the details for each experimental decision
separately. After every instruction set, participants were asked to
write down their decisions privately and proceed to the next task.
To control for possible order effects on decisions, the order both
between and within games was randomised across participants,
resulting in 24 different orders (always setting aside the two
decisions of the same game). On average, the eighty subjects who
were randomly selected for real payment earned J9.60 (min J0;
max J40).
Variables of interest and basic statistics
The dataset is very rich and facilitates the use of a large battery
of controls. After the exclusion of the 69 observations with missing
values in any of the variables used, we arrived at a sample size of
766 individuals (although 10 extra observations are excluded for
the analysis of religious participation within Catholics).
Experimental design and variables: We have five basic
measurements based on subjects’ behaviour in the experimental
games, each reflecting a dimension of social behaviour: genuine
altruism, strategic altruism, sense of fairness, trust, and positive
reciprocity. The derivation of these elements is described below:
In the DG, subjects had to split a ‘‘pie’’ of J20 between
themselves and an anonymous participant. Subjects decided which
share of the J20, in J2 increments, they wanted to transfer to the
other participant. Hence, this variable facilitates the observation of
genuine altruism/generosity.
In the case of the UG, proposers made an offer (also from a pie
of J20) to the responder, but implementation was upon
acceptance of the offer by the randomly matched responder. In
case of rejection neither participant earned anything. For the role
of the responder we used the strategy method, in which subjects
have to state their willingness to accept or reject each of the
proposals. Since low offers in the UG might be rejected, we
consider proposers’ generous offers as strategic altruism. The
subjects’ minimum acceptable offer (MAO) as responders in the
UG – that is, the minimum amount of money that the subject
would accept – reflects a sense of self-centred fairness (negative
reciprocity against unfair treatment or aversion to inequality, at
least to disadvantageous inequality).
In the TG (a binary version created in [50]), the trustor (1st
mover) had to decide whether to pass J10 or J0 euros to the
trustee (2nd mover). In case of passing nothing, the trustor earned
J10 and the trustee nothing. If she/he passed the J10, the trustee
would receive J40 (the amount of money was quadrupled). In the
second step: the trustee, conditional on the trustor having passed
the money, had to decide whether to send back J22, and keep
J18 for himself, or keep all J40 without sending anything back, in
which case the trustor would not earn anything. Hence, a trustor
passing the money in this binary TG reflects confidence in the
trustworthiness of the trustee, while the trustee returning a positive
amount of money indicates positive reciprocity since she/he could
keep the whole pie.
Religious dimensions: The first section of the survey includes
questions on the following aspects of religiosity (relative frequen-
cies of responses in parentheses):
Item 15 relates to religious denomination/beliefs ‘‘As far as your
religious denomination/beliefs are concerned, do you classify
yourself as: No religion (31.3%, NR hereafter), Catholic
(61.6%), Muslim (2%), Evangelical (0.8%), other religion
(4.3%)’’.
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Item 15.1 focuses on frequency of attendance of church (place of
worship) services (relative frequencies among Catholics, in
parentheses). ‘‘How often do you go to church (place of worship)?
Never (40.5%), less than once a month (26.6%), once in a month
(14.1%), once in a week (16.7%), every day (2.2%)’’.
Items 16 and 16.1 relate to changes in the religious denomi-
nation: ‘‘Have you ever changed your religious denomination/
beliefs? Yes (16.2%), No (83.8%)’’.
Individuals who changed denomination were then asked:
‘‘Before changing your denomination/beliefs, you identified your
denomination/beliefs as: No religion (0%), Catholic (98.3%),
Muslim (0%), Evangelical (0%), other religion (1.7%)’’.
The combination of information derived from questions 15 and
16 enables the calculation of the share of subjects who were (raised
as) Catholics and currently claim to have ‘‘no religion’’ (NR).
Indeed, this group comprises 12.3% of the sample, which also
means that the vast majority (75.8%) of those who switched to
another denomination were raised as Catholics and are now
affiliated with ‘‘no religion’’. This is another indication of
secularisation in Spain (see also [45])
Definition of socio-economic control variables and descriptive
statistics: Table 3 presents descriptive statistics (min, max, mean
and SD) of the main variables of interest of this study. Block ‘‘a’’
relates to controls, block ‘‘b’’ to religious dimensions, and block
‘‘c’’ to experimental variables.
The definitions of control variables that are not self-explanatory
are the following: Household income refers to self-reported
household monthly income and consists of 10 categories corre-
sponding to J0-J4,500 (in J500 increments); Education refers to
the subject’s educational level and has 9 categories from ‘‘did not
study at all’’ to ‘‘a graduate university degree’’. Cohabiting takes on
the value of one if the subject declares living with a partner not
within wedlock, and zero otherwise.
Impatience corresponds to the number of impatient choices the
subject made in an inter-temporal choice task and captures
preference for sooner-smaller rewards over larger but more
delayed rewards (see [40] for further details on this survey-based
discounting task). For eliciting impatience, hypothetical rewards
were used due to logistical reasons and because previous evidence
has shown that the use of real (vs. hypothetical) incentives does not
significantly change the distribution of individual inter-temporal
choices (see, e.g., [51], [52]). The measure of impatience is
included as a control since the payments of the experiment were
Table 3. Descriptive statistics.
Variable min max mean SD
a: Controls
age 16 89 37.677 17.098
male* 0 1 0.463 0.499
household income 0 9 3.828 2.413
education 0 8 5.065 2.258
unemployed* 0 1 0.472 0.500
married* 0 1 0.365 0.482
divorced* 0 1 0.040 0.197
widowed* 0 1 0.043 0.203
cohabiting* 0 1 0.038 0.191
impatience 0 11 7.930 3.008
risk 1* 0 1 0.137 0.344
risk 2* 0 1 0.334 0.472
risk 3* 0 1 0.090 0.286
cognitive skills 0 5 2.522 1.318
many immigr 1 7 4.639 2.181
big public sector* 0 1 0.619 0.486
b: Religiosity
Catholic* 0 1 0.616 0.487
No religion* 0 1 0.313 0.464
Active Catholic*‘ 0 1 0.322 0.468
NR-before Cath*{ 0 1 0.392 0.489
c: Experimental Games
DG offer 0 20 7.833 4.285
UG offer 0 20 9.296 2.982
UG MAO 0 10 6.980 3.587
Trustor* 0 1 0.708 0.455
Trustee* 0 1 0.711 0.454
Legend: *dummy variable, ‘only among Catholics,{only among non-believers.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0104685.t003
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delayed, and it has been found to affect behaviour in strategic
social interactions ([40], [53], [54]).
Risk 1, risk 2 and risk 3 refer to the subject’s attitudes toward
financial risk and are dummy variables where 1 means that the
subject chose the risky option, and 0 if chose the non-risky option.
As for the impatience task, decisions on risk-taking were made over
hypothetical monetary incentives. Here, however, it is fair to think
that the use of hypothetical instead of real gambles might have
influenced subjects’ choices (see for instance [55]). Risk attitudes
are controlled for since payments were probabilistic and both the
UG and the TG involve some strategic risk. The risk questions are
the following:
Risk 1: 1 if option b, 0 if option a in the question: ‘‘We flip a
coin. Choose one of the following options: a. Take 1.000 Euros no
matter if it is heads or tails; b. Take 2.000 Euros if it is heads and
nothing if it is tails’’.
Risk 2: 1 if option a, 0 if option b in the question: ‘‘Choose one of
the following options: a. Take a lottery ticket with 80% chance of
winning 45 Euros and 20% chance of winning nothing; b. Take
30 Euros’’.
Risk 3: 1 if ‘Yes’, 0 if ‘No’ in the question: ‘‘Would you accept the
following deal? We flip a coin. If it is heads you win 1,500 Euros
and if it is tails you lose 1,000 Euros’’.
Note that risk 1 captures ‘‘risk-loving’’ in the domain of gains
when both the risky and the non-risky option have the same
expected value. Risk 2 captures risk-loving in the gains domain as
well, but in a question where the risky option yields a higher
expected value than the non-risky one. Finally, risk 3 captures risk
loving when the risky option involves possible losses.
Cogn skills refers to cognitive skills measured by the number of
correct answers in a five-question mathematical test. Two
additional controls are included as proxies for political orientation,
as religious adherence has been associated with different political
preferences, such as racism and conservative attitudes ([21]).Many
immigr captures the degree of agreement (on a seven-point Likert
scale) with the statement ‘‘there are too many immigrants in
Spain’’; big public sector is a dummy variable that takes on the
value of one if the subject answers positively the question ‘‘Do you
think that the public sector in Spain is too large?’’.
The religiosity-related variables of block b are the following:
Active=1 if the respondent reports that she/he attends church
services once a month or more, and = 0 if attendance is less
frequent than once a month; NR-before Cath=1 if the respondent
changed her/his religious denomination from Catholic to no-
religion ( = 0 otherwise).
Finally, the experimental variables: trustor=1 if the subject
passed the money to the trustee when in the role of trustor in the
TG, and = 0 if she/he did not; while trustee=1 if the subject
reciprocated the trustor’s trust, and = 0 otherwise.
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